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On Virtue Ethics$
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Rosalind Hursthouse

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247998

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199247994.001.0001

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Naturalism for Rational Animals

Naturalism for Rational Animals

(p.217) 10 Naturalism for Rational Animals
On Virtue Ethics

Rosalind Hursthouse (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Ethical naturalism is not to be construed as the attempt to ground ethical evaluations in a scientific account of human nature; ethical evaluations are disanalogous to non‐ethical ones in various ways. Both depend upon our identifying what is characteristic of the species in question. But the other animals’ characteristic ways of going on are many, and ours is just one—a rational way—which introduces a normative aspect.

Keywords:   ethical evaluations, ethical naturalism, human nature, normativity, rationality

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