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On Virtue Ethics$
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Rosalind Hursthouse

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247998

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199247994.001.0001

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(p.239) 11 Objectivity
On Virtue Ethics

Rosalind Hursthouse (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The two different interpretations of the premise that ‘a virtue is a character trait a human being needs for eudaimonia’ can ultimately be seen as interdependent, for both rely on the idea that our nature is such that the virtues, as we know them, suit human beings. The rival view, that human nature is not harmonious is not a new idea arriving with Darwinism, but as old as misanthropy and amounts to global moral scepticism.

Keywords:   Darwinism, eudaimonia, human nature, moral scepticism, objectivity, virtues

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