Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
On Virtue Ethics$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Rosalind Hursthouse

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247998

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199247994.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 05 December 2020

Right Action

Right Action

(p.25) 1 Right Action
On Virtue Ethics

Rosalind Hursthouse (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

It has been said that virtue ethics does not, and cannot, provide action guidance, the way utilitarianism and deontology do because it rejects codifiability and does not come up with any rules or principles. But this is a misconception: virtue ethics can provide a specification of ‘right action’—as ‘what a virtuous agent would, characteristically do in the circumstances’—and such a specification can be regarded as generating a number of moral rules, called ‘v‐rules’. Each virtue generates an instruction—‘do what is honest’, ‘do what is charitable,’ and each vice a prohibition—‘do not act, do what is dishonest, uncharitable..’

Keywords:   codifiability, deontology, moral rules, right action, utilitarianism, virtue ethics

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .