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On Virtue Ethics$
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Rosalind Hursthouse

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199247998

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199247994.001.0001

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Moral Motivation

Moral Motivation

(p.141) 7 Moral Motivation
On Virtue Ethics

Rosalind Hursthouse (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Moreover, acting from virtue, from a settled state of character, sets the standard for acting from duty, or because one thinks it is right. Whatever their sincerely avowed reasons for acting, people act ‘from duty’ to the extent that their character resembles that of the ideally virtuous agent. Hence moral motivation can be a matter of degree, and is not introspectible.

Keywords:   acting from duty, acting from virtue, moral motivation

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