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Incentives and Political Economy$
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Jean-Jacques Laffont

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248681

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199248680.001.0001

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(p.1) 1 Introduction
Incentives and Political Economy

Jean‐Jacques Laffont (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The author traces the origins of incentives in the design of political institutions to the works of Adam Smith, the American Federalists, and R. Frisch. The Chicago View of interest group politics is critically reviewed and seen as the background for the modern principal‐agent analysis of political economy. The structure of the book is reviewed and basic concepts of complete and incomplete contracting, asymmetric information, and endogenous coalition formation are introduced.

Keywords:   asymmetric information, contracting, endogenous coalition formation, Federalists, Ragnar Frisch, incentives, interest groups, political institutions, principal‐agent analysis, Adam Smith

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