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Incentives and Political Economy$
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Jean-Jacques Laffont

Print publication date: 2001

Print ISBN-13: 9780199248681

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199248680.001.0001

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The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design

The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design

(p.17) 2 The Complete Contract Approach to Constitutional Design
Incentives and Political Economy

Jean‐Jacques Laffont (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter introduces a simple supervision model based on Tirole's methodology in which the Constitution has to be designed, given the need for informed politicians who act as supervisors. It is shown how an optimal Constitution will have to create incentives so as to avoid the capture of politicians by interest groups. Also, improved supervision is shown to increase welfare and decrease corruption.

Keywords:   capture, constitutional design, corruption, incentives, interest groups, supervision, Jean Tirole, welfare

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