- Title Pages
- Note to the Original Edition of Moral Obligation
- Introduction to the Paperback Edition of Moral Obligation and Duty and Interest
- Editor's Introduction (2002)
- List of Prichard's Writings
- Note on the Contents
- 1. What Is the Basis of Moral Obligation?
- 2. Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?
- 3. Duty and Interest
- 4. Kant's Fundamental Principles of the Metaphysic of Morals <sup>*</sup>
- 5. A Conflict of Duties
- 6. Duty and Ignorance of Fact
- 7. The Meaning of ἀγαθόν In the Ethics of Aristotle
- 8. Manuscript on Morals
- 9. Moral Obligation
- 10. Green: Political Obligation
- 11. The Object of a Desire
- 12. The Obligation to Keep a Promise
- 13. Exchanging
- 14. The Time of an Obligation
- 15. The Psychology of Willing
- 16. Acting, Willing, Desiring
- 17. ‘Ought’
- (p.282) 17. ‘Ought’
- Moral Writings
H. A. Prichard
- Oxford University Press
Prichard's topic here is the nature of ‘ought’. If we were to take ‘I ought to will x’ to be equivalent to ‘my willing x ought to exist’, then it is true that ‘If I were to will a certain change x, my willing x would be something that ought to exist.’ For this to hold, either my willing x would itself be something good or my willing x would cause something good (and so be something that ought to exist). Prichard, however, rejects this view on the grounds that one cannot know, in willing x to exist, whether one's willing x is something that ought to exist. One can only know that if one were to will x, one would be willing something that one thought ought to exist.
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