Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Moral Writings$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

H. A. Prichard and Jim MacAdam

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199250196

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199250197.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 30 November 2020

Duty and Interest

Duty and Interest

(p.21) 3. Duty and Interest
Moral Writings

H. A. Prichard

Oxford University Press

To the many moral theorists who have sought to establish a necessary connection between duty and interest, Prichard replies that their project ought not to be undertaken as it commits us to the view that our only duty is to do what is to our advantage. In discussing the attempts of Plato, Butler, and Green to link duty and interest, Prichard, like Kant, maintains that the rightness of action does not depend either upon our own good or upon our belief that it depends upon our own good. Similarly, Prichard dismisses the view that our desire for our own good is our only motive.

Keywords:   desire, duty, good, interest, Kant, motive, Plato

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .