On the Necessity of Origin
On the Necessity of Origin
McGinn contests Mackie's reductive explanation of Kripke's claim that the origin of a thing constitutes a de re necessity (i.e. that a thing's origin is essential to it). On McGinn's non‐reductive alternative, a biological entity's origin is essential because its developmental continuity (e.g. from gametes to zygote to foetus to infant to child to adult) is. Moreover, the necessity of a biological organism's developmental continuity is distinct from the necessity of an artefact's constitution (e.g. this chair's being made of that particular bit of wood).
Keywords: de dicto, de re, Dummett, essence, essentialism, identity, Kripke, Mackie, necessity, necessity of origin, origin, species
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