Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
The Right and the Good$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

David Ross and Philip Stratton-Lake

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199252657

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199252653.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 04 December 2020

Degrees of Goodness

Degrees of Goodness

Chapter:
(p.142) VI Degrees of Goodness
Source:
The Right and the Good
Author(s):

W. D. Ross

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199252653.003.0006

This is the fourth of five chapters on good, and looks at the question of whether goods are commensurable—measurable in degrees. As a preliminary, the question is asked as to whether pleasures are commensurable, and as a preliminary to that question, whether pleasures are comparable, and whether one pleasure can be said to be greater or more pleasant than another. The chapter examines two of three aspects of degrees of goodness: the commensuration (calculus) of pleasures against one another; and the commensuration of different states of knowledge against one another, including the dependence of the value of a state of knowledge on the nature of the state of mind, and the value of a state of opinion (which is regarded as inferior to knowledge); the third aspect, the balancing of virtuous actions and dispositions against one another, is examined in the next (and last) chapter. The question is then addressed as to whether virtue, knowledge, and pleasure can be compared in value—measured against one another; here, evidence is put forward to support Ross's view that pleasure is inferior in value to virtue and knowledge. The last part of the chapter looks at the relative value of moral goodness (which is discussed in the next chapter) and value as ends in themselves.

Keywords:   commensuration, degrees of goodness, good, goodness, knowledge, measurement, moral goodness, opinion, pleasure, state of knowledge, state of mind, state of opinion, value, virtue

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .