Sentiment and Self‐Control
Sentiment and Self‐Control
Peirce argued that the use of induction depended upon the possession of altruistic sentiments. This chapter explores these arguments and considers Hilary Putnam's reasons for thinking that Peirce has provided a flawed answer to an important and previously unknown problem. This problem concerns the application of probability judgements in particular cases. The core of the chapter is an exploration of Peirce's cognitive account of emotions and sentiments and his account of the role of such states in the rational self‐control of action and inquiry.
Keywords: altruism, emotions, induction, Peirce, probability, Putnam, self‐control, sentiments
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