Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Truth, Rationality, and PragmatismThemes from Peirce$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Christopher Hookway

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256587

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199256586.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 January 2021

Sentiment and Self‐Control

Sentiment and Self‐Control

(p.223) 9 Sentiment and Self‐Control
Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism

Christopher Hookway (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Peirce argued that the use of induction depended upon the possession of altruistic sentiments. This chapter explores these arguments and considers Hilary Putnam's reasons for thinking that Peirce has provided a flawed answer to an important and previously unknown problem. This problem concerns the application of probability judgements in particular cases. The core of the chapter is an exploration of Peirce's cognitive account of emotions and sentiments and his account of the role of such states in the rational self‐control of action and inquiry.

Keywords:   altruism, emotions, induction, Peirce, probability, Putnam, self‐control, sentiments

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .