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Truth, Rationality, and PragmatismThemes from Peirce$
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Christopher Hookway

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256587

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199256586.001.0001

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Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry

Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry

(p.246) 10 Doubt: Affective States and the Regulation of Inquiry
Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism

Christopher Hookway (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Central to Peirce's rejection of the Cartesian obsession with scepticism is the claim that sceptical arguments do not produce real doubt. This chapter provides a detailed examination of the role of doubt in the regulation in inquiry, claiming that states of real doubt involve immediate cognitive evaluations that are manifested in emotional reactions such as epistemic anxiety. Many of our most important epistemic evaluations reflect habitual standards of evaluation that are not explicitly articulated and that are expressed in emotional evaluations.

Keywords:   Cartesianism, doubt, emotions, evaluation, habits, real doubt, scepticism

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