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Truth, Rationality, and PragmatismThemes from Peirce$
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Christopher Hookway

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256587

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199256586.001.0001

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Belief, Confidence, and the Method of Science

Belief, Confidence, and the Method of Science

(p.21) 1 Belief, Confidence, and the Method of Science
Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism

Christopher Hookway (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

A discussion of Peirce's claim that belief has no place in science and his views of the different roles of rational self‐control in dealing with scientific matters and with ‘vital questions’. This appears to be in conflict with Peirce's defence of the scientific method as the best method for the fixation of belief. There is also discussion of Peirce's claim that the laws of logic are regulative ideas, or hopes.

Keywords:   fixation of belief, hope, Peirce, practices, regulative idea, scientific method, theory, vital questions

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