Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Truth, Rationality, and PragmatismThemes from Peirce$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Christopher Hookway

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256587

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199256586.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 21 January 2021

Truth and the Convergence of Opinion

Truth and the Convergence of Opinion

(p.44) 2 Truth and the Convergence of Opinion
Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism

Christopher Hookway (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter is an extended discussion of Peirce's definition of truth as that on which inquiry is fated to converge. A detailed examination of how this thesis is to be formulated is followed by a discussion of the problem of ‘buried secrets’, of truths that are lost and will never be recovered. It is argued that pragmatist clarifications of concepts differ from other kinds of philosophical analyses, and that Peirce's account of truth is an account of the commitments we incur when we assert a proposition. It is also argued that the pragmatist clarification of truth is metaphysically neutral, leading neither to realism nor to anti‐realism.

Keywords:   anti‐realism, assertion, convergence, inquiry, Peirce, pragmatist theory of truth, realism, truth

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .