Truth and Correspondence
Truth and Correspondence
Talk of truth as ‘correspondence to reality’ can be a platitude or a substantial and controversial philosophical theory. The chapter argues that pragmatists can accept the platitude of correspondence, but that they reject the substantial metaphysics or truth as correspondence and metaphysical realism. The second half of the chapter argues that Peirce's account of the role of iconic representations, such as diagrams—in cognition and ordinary language—can capture some important insights of the traditional correspondence theory of truth.
Keywords: correspondence theory of truth, iconic representation, metaphysical realism, Peirce, realism
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