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Truth, Rationality, and PragmatismThemes from Peirce$
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Christopher Hookway

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256587

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199256586.001.0001

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Truth and Reference: Peirce Versus Royce

Truth and Reference: Peirce Versus Royce

(p.108) 4 Truth and Reference: Peirce Versus Royce
Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism

Christopher Hookway (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

A discussion of a dispute between Royce and Peirce about truth and the possibility of false belief. Royce argued that only an absolute idealist can make sense of how we can refer to objects about which we have false beliefs. Peirce responded that this argument rested upon a flawed theory of reference: once we recognize that our primary kind of reference uses indexical signs, we can reconcile realism with the possibility of false belief. The chapter explores Peirce's account of indexical reference and its relation to his realism.

Keywords:   absolute idealism, belief, false belief, indexical reference, Peirce, realism, reference, Royce, truth

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