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Truth, Rationality, and PragmatismThemes from Peirce$
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Christopher Hookway

Print publication date: 2002

Print ISBN-13: 9780199256587

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199256586.001.0001

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Vagueness, Logic, and Interpretation

Vagueness, Logic, and Interpretation

(p.135) 5 Vagueness, Logic, and Interpretation
Truth, Rationality, and Pragmatism

Christopher Hookway (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This discussion of Peirce's account of vagueness begins with a comparison of the attitudes towards vagueness of Frege, Peirce, and Wittgenstein. It explores Peirce's account of vagueness through an exploration of his account of assertion and his semiotic account of quantification in natural languages. The place of bivalence in his philosophy is discussed, as are his claims about the importance of vagueness for science and other kinds of cognition.

Keywords:   assertion, bivalence, Frege, Peirce, quantification, science, vagueness, Wittgenstein

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