Common Sense, Pragmatism, and Rationality
Common Sense, Pragmatism, and Rationality
Peirce defended ‘critical common‐sensism’, a modification of the common‐sense philosophy of Reid that reflected Peirce's Kantian affiliations. This chapter explores what is distinctive in Peirce's form of common‐sensism, discusses a range of examples of common‐sense beliefs, and discusses the role of the appeal to common‐sense in Pierce's account of rational self‐control. This appeal to common‐sense is an important plank in Peirce's rejection of Descartes's strategies in epistemology and in his defence of pragmatism.
Keywords: common sense, Descartes, Kant, Peirce, pragmatism, Reid, self‐control
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