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Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality$
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Sarah Stroud and Christine Tappolet

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199257362

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199257361.001.0001

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Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement

Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement

(p.121) 5 Weakness of Will and Practical Judgement
Weakness of Will and Practical Irrationality

Sarah Stroud (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

A practical judgement is one which enjoys an internal, necessary relation to subsequent action or intention, and which can serve as a sufficient explanation of such action or intention. Does the phenomenon of weakness of will show that deliberation does not characteristically issue in such practical judgements? The author argues that the possibility of akrasia does not threaten the view that we make practical judgements, when the latter thesis is properly understood. Indeed, the author suggests that the alleged possibility of global akrasia actually supports the practical‐judgement model over what she considers its main rival, a kind of ‘Humean externalism’ about practical reason.

Keywords:   akrasia, deliberation, explanation of action, externalism, instrumentalist principle, internalism, practical judgement, practical reasoning, The Tortoise and Achilles, weakness of will

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