Germany: Stability and Strategy in a Mixed‐Member Proportional System
Germany: Stability and Strategy in a Mixed‐Member Proportional System
If mixed-member systems are ‘in vogue’, then the choice of many electoral reformers in Germany is the archetype for this system. Electors have two votes, one for a candidate in a single member district and one for a party on a closed party list. Voters can, and increasingly do ‘split their tickets’, voting strategically for different parties on the two ballots, with the possible aim of influencing coalition formation. The electoral system has enjoyed strong support and is unlikely to be changed.
Keywords: mixed-member proportional, legal threshold, ticket-splitting, surplus seats
Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.
Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.
If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.
To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .
