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Mixed-Member Electoral SystemsThe Best of Both Worlds?$
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Matthew Soberg Shugart and Martin P. Wattenberg

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199257683

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/019925768X.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 18 September 2021

The Legislative Consequences of MMP Electoral Rules in Venezuela

The Legislative Consequences of MMP Electoral Rules in Venezuela

(p.404) 18 The Legislative Consequences of MMP Electoral Rules in Venezuela
Mixed-Member Electoral Systems

Michael R. Kulisheck

Brian F. Crisp

Oxford University Press

The inaugural mixed‐member proportional (MMP) elections were held in Venezuela in 1993. According to the MMP electoral rules in Venezuela, approximately half of the Chamber of Deputies is elected from single‐seat districts in the nominal tier of the system, and half is elected from closed party lists in the list tier. Analyzes how electoral incentives associated with the two tiers affect campaigns, elections, legislative entrepreneurship, and representation, and considers political behaviour and attitudes to be responses both to the institutional incentives associated with electoral rules and party structures, and to the actions of politically active citizens and interest organizations. The chapter has three sections: the first discusses the effects of MMP on the interparty dimension, examining proportionality and the effective number of parties, and analyzing party strategies for joining pre‐election coalitions in the nominal and list tier elections; the second and third sections look at the intraparty dimension, analyzing distinctions between the incentives and behaviour of members elected in each tier. The second section analyzes legislative entrepreneurship in the Chamber of Deputies before and after the adoption of the MMP system; the third section (Legislators, Parties and Representation) shows that legislators elected in the nominal and list tiers view campaigns and legislative representation differently, but that the adoption of MMP rules has not altered the strong relationships between established interest organizations and representatives in the Congress.

Keywords:   campaigns, coalitions, elections, electoral reform, electoral rules, electoral systems, interest organizations, interparty dimension, intraparty dimension, legislative entrepreneurship, list tier, mixed‐member electoral systems, mixed‐member proportional systems, nominal tier, party structures, political attitudes, political behavior, representation, Venezuela

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