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A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals$
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Jonathan Bennett

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199258871

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199258872.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 May 2021

Subjunctive Conditionals and Probability

Subjunctive Conditionals and Probability

(p.246) 16 Subjunctive Conditionals and Probability
A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Jonathan Bennett

Oxford University Press

By Lewis's account, it may be unduly hard for subjunctive conditionals to be outright true. We could weaken them by deeming each one to be true if its antecedent makes its consequent highly probable. Or we could follow Edgington's proposal that subjunctive conditionals should not be thought of in terms of truth at all but only of probability. It is shown here that adopting this proposal would not significantly narrow the chasm between subjunctives and indicatives.

Keywords:   conditionals, Edgington, indicative conditionals, Lewis, probability, subjunctive conditionals, truth value

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