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A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals$
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A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals

Jonathan Bennett

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199258871

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: November 2003

DOI: 10.1093/0199258872.001.0001

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Relating the Two Kinds of Conditional

Relating the Two Kinds of Conditional

Chapter:
(p.336) 22 Relating the Two Kinds of Conditional
Source:
A Philosophical Guide to Conditionals
Author(s):

Jonathan Bennett

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199258872.003.0022

Presents Bennett's theory about the different kinds of bases upon which indicative conditionals may be accepted; bases that enable one to explain the antecedent, or the consequent, or some other fact not expressed in the conditional. It is shown that bases of two of these kinds also support the corresponding subjunctive, while bases of the third kind do not; and that the classification of bases does not yield a classification of conditionals. This destroys the only persuasive reason for accepting the relocation thesis, according to which subjunctives should be grouped with indicatives of the type ‘If it rains tonight, the roads will be wet in the morning’.

Keywords:   conditionals, indicative conditionals, relocation, subjunctive conditionals

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