Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Moral Realism – A Defence - Oxford Scholarship Online
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Moral Realism: A Defence

Russ Shafer-Landau


This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is ... More

Keywords: externalism about reasons, metaethics, moral disagreement, moral epistemology, moral facts, moral motivation, moral rationalism, moral realism, moral reasons, motivational internalism, non‐naturalism, reliabilism, self‐evidence/self‐evident, supervenience

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2003 Print ISBN-13: 9780199259755
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005 DOI:10.1093/0199259755.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Russ Shafer-Landau, author
Department of Philosophy, University of Wisconsin-Madison
Author Webpage

Show Summary Details

subscribe or login to access all content.