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This is a book in metaethics that defends a brand of moral realism known as non‐naturalism. The book has five Parts. Part I outlines the sort of moral realism that the author wishes to defend, and then offers critiques of expressivism and constructivism. Part II is devoted to issues in metaphysics. It argues that moral realists have adequate replies to worries based on supervenience and the alleged causal inefficacy of moral facts. Part III is devoted to issues of moral motivation. It argues that motivational internalism is false, and that a Humean theory of action is also mistaken. Part IV is ... More
Keywords: externalism about reasons, metaethics, moral disagreement, moral epistemology, moral facts, moral motivation, moral rationalism, moral realism, moral reasons, motivational internalism, non‐naturalism, reliabilism, self‐evidence/self‐evident, supervenience
Print publication date: 2003 | Print ISBN-13: 9780199259755 |
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005 | DOI:10.1093/0199259755.001.0001 |
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