Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Moral RealismA Defence$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199259755

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 12 August 2020

Rationality and Disagreement

Rationality and Disagreement

Chapter:
(p.215) Rationality and Disagreement 9
Source:
Moral Realism
Author(s):

Russ Shafer-Landau (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199259755.003.0010

Distinguishes two strands of the classic antirealist argument from moral disagreement. The first has it that the extent of actual disagreement provides the basis of an inference to best explanation to antirealism. The second claims that ideal observers would disagree about moral matters, and this justifies an antirealist verdict. The author Replies to these criticisms in a number of ways, but the one the author likes the most invokes an ethics‐philosophy parallel. Since intractable disagreement among wise, informed and rational people about philosophical matters does not license a verdict of philosophical antirealism, it should not do so when the subject is ethics proper.

Keywords:   ideal observers, moral disagreement, philosophical antirealism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .