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Moral RealismA Defence$
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Russ Shafer-Landau

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199259755

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: January 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199259755.001.0001

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Moral Rationalism

Moral Rationalism

(p.190) Moral Rationalism 8
Moral Realism

Russ Shafer-Landau (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Defends the idea that moral facts constitute excellent reasons for action, regardless of one's antecedent commitments. Provides some presumptive support for this claim, and then proceeds to criticize the best arguments against moral rationalism (the idea that moral duties entail powerful reasons for action), including a prominent argument by Philippa Foot. Ends by arguing that the idea of intrinsic normativity is not as implausible as many have thought.

Keywords:   Philippa Foot, intrinsic normativity, moral rationalism, reasons for action

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