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Doubt Truth to be a Liar$
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Doubt Truth to be a Liar

Graham Priest

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199263288

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199263280.001.0001

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Logical Pluralism

Logical Pluralism

Chapter:
(p.194) 12 Logical Pluralism
Source:
Doubt Truth to be a Liar
Author(s):

Graham Priest (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199263280.003.0013

This chapter distinguishes between various senses in which one might be a pluralist about logic. In several of these, pluralism is uncontentiously correct. The difficult issue is whether there are different accounts of validity that are equally correct. It argues for logical monism in this regard.

Keywords:   logical pluralism, application of logic, validity, Batens, da Costa, Restall, Beall

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