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Doubt Truth to be a Liar$
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Doubt Truth to be a Liar

Graham Priest

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199263288

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199263280.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 January 2021

Trivialism

Trivialism

Chapter:
(p.56) 3 Trivialism
Source:
Doubt Truth to be a Liar
Author(s):

Graham Priest (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199263280.003.0004

This chapter discusses trivialism, the view that all contradictions (and so all claims) are true. It examines the grounds for rejecting the view, and how one would go about engaging an opponent who holds trivialism to be true.

Keywords:   trivialism, dialetheism, Aristotle, perception, rules of debate

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