Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Motivation, Agency, and Public PolicyOf Knights and Knaves, Pawns and Queens$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

Julian Le Grand

Print publication date: 2003

Print ISBN-13: 9780199266999

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2004

DOI: 10.1093/0199266999.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2020. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 28 November 2020

Health Care

Health Care

(p.95) 7 Health Care
Motivation, Agency, and Public Policy

Julian Le Grand (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Examines the development of robust incentive structures in health care, using two examples from British health care: the holding of budgets for hospital care by organisations of primary‐care physicians (General Practitioner practices and, more recently, Primary Care Trusts), and the payment of hospital specialists or consultants. It concludes that it is possible to design policies that offer robust incentives to medical professionals, that empower patients, but that avoid the problems of unfettered patient choice. Devices such as allowing budget‐holding professionals to keep surpluses on their budget, providing those surpluses are spent in a way that improves patient care, or paying professionals fee‐for‐service at a rate that incorporates some sacrifice compared with alternatives, help align knightly and knavish motivations.

Keywords:   budget‐holding, consultants, General Practitioners, GP fund‐holding, incentives, payment of hospital specialists, PCTs, Primary Care Trusts

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .