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Ethicsand "The Nature of Moral Philosophy"$
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G. E. Moore and William H. Shaw

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199272013

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199272018.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 19 April 2021

Intrinsic Value

Intrinsic Value

(p.116) 7 Intrinsic Value

G. E. Moore

Oxford University Press

In this final chapter, Moore rebuts egoism and upholds the view that it is always our duty to perform that action, of the various ones open to us, the total consequences of which will have the greatest intrinsic value. He criticizes the hedonistic doctrine that one whole is intrinsically better than another when, and only when, it contains more pleasure. He rejects not only the idea that intrinsic value is proportional to pleasure, but also that it is proportional to any other single factor. He concludes by distinguishing different senses in which a thing can be good or bad.

Keywords:   criterion of right, egoism, good effects, intrinsically better, intrinsically good, quantity of pleasure, subjective predicates, total consequences, value of a whole

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