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Double-Effect ReasoningDoing Good and Avoiding Evil$
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T. A. Cavanaugh

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199272198

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199272190.001.0001

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The i/f distinction: distinguishing intent from foresight

The i/f distinction: distinguishing intent from foresight

(p.73) 3 The i/f distinction: distinguishing intent from foresight
Double-Effect Reasoning

T. A. Cavanaugh (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter analyzes the intended/foreseen (i/f) distinction: how to name it, how to make it, and how to apply it to the classic cases of euthanasia/terminal sedation, craniotomy/hysterectomy, and terror bombing/tactical bombing. Addressing the problem of closeness Foot moots, inadequate responses to this problem are considered such as paring one’s intentions, the counter-factual test, and conceptual necessity. The chapter presents an account of the i/f distinction based on the resources found in Aquinas, Anscombe, and Bratman who indicate how intention characteristically differs from foresight insofar as the former is while the latter is not a plan of action formed in deliberation embodying practical knowledge.

Keywords:   Anscombe, Aquinas, Bratman, deliberation, double effect, Foot, intended distinction, foreseen distinction, intention, foresight

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