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Tracking TruthKnowledge, Evidence, and Science$
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Sherrilyn Roush

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199274734

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199274738.001.0001

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Tracking with Closure

Tracking with Closure

(p.38) 2 Tracking with Closure
Tracking Truth

Sherrilyn Roush (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter formulates the new tracking account of knowledge, in terms of conditional probability rather than counterfactuals. The new view dispenses with relativization to the method of belief formation, and gives knowledge closure via a recursion clause that incorporates a new account of knowledge of implication. This view is defended against charges that the tracking view is too strong.

Keywords:   epistemic closure, skepticism, tracking, sensitivity, method, belief, known implication, probability, variation, adherence

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