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Tracking TruthKnowledge, Evidence, and Science$
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Sherrilyn Roush

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199274734

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199274738.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 08 March 2021

Tracking: More and Better

Tracking: More and Better

(p.75) 3 Tracking: More and Better
Tracking Truth

Sherrilyn Roush (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter introduces the rules of applying the tracking conditions, and discusses the upshot of formulating the tracking conditions in terms of probability and counterfactuals. Criteria are introduced which provide a solution to the generality problem for tracking. Special kinds of epistemic luck are discussed, and the new view is defended against charges that tracking is too weak as an account of knowledge.

Keywords:   conditional probability, counterfactual, generality problem, tracking conditions, rules of application, Kripke barns, dumb luck, blind luck, future, causal overdetermination

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