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Tracking TruthKnowledge, Evidence, and Science$
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Sherrilyn Roush

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199274734

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: February 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199274738.001.0001

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Tracking over the Rivals

Tracking over the Rivals

(p.117) 4 Tracking over the Rivals
Tracking Truth

Sherrilyn Roush (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter argues that the new tracking view is superior to externalist rivals: process reliabilism, the safety view, and the relevant alternatives view. This is because of the generality problem, and treatments of reflective knowledge, lottery propositions, direction of fit with the world, the power property, and knowledge of logical and other necessary truths. A new view of logical truth is introduced, which is in keeping with the tracking view that knowledge is a matter of responsiveness to the way the world is.

Keywords:   sensitivity, safety, relevant alternatives, lottery, logical truth, necessary truth, reflective knowledge, power, direction of fit, responsiveness

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