What is Evidence? Discrimination, Indication, and Leverage
What is Evidence? Discrimination, Indication, and Leverage
This chapter explains the motivations behind a tracking view of what evidence is, and formulates such a view in terms of conditional probability. This view is a likelihood ratio confirmation theory, which is considered superior to approaches using other measures of confirmation. Beyond confirmational support, a new constraint is formulated to put a lower bound on the posterior probability of the hypothesis. It is shown that knowledge, on the new tracking view, has a sufficiently strong transitivity property to explain why better evidence makes one more likely to know when to conjoin the tracking view of evidence with the tracking view of knowledge.
Keywords: evidence, confirmation, discrimination, indication, transitivity, probability, measure, likelihood ratio, deductive support
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