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A Theory of Political ObligationMembership, Commitment, and the Bonds of Society$
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Margaret Gilbert

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199274956

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199274959.001.0001

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Joint Commitment and Obligation

Joint Commitment and Obligation

(p.125) 7 Joint Commitment and Obligation
A Theory of Political Obligation

Margaret Gilbert (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Joint commitments are compared and contrasted with personal decisions and intentions: all are in some sense commitments of the will. They provide one with sufficient reason for action, independently of one’s inclinations and self-interest. Aspects of joint commitment discussed include their formation, basic and non-basic cases, and ways of being freed from them. An argument is presented for the obligating nature of joint commitments. The directed obligation argued for is not context-sensitive and is therefore, in a sense, ‘absolute’.

Keywords:   absolute obligation, commitment, context-sensitive, decision, directed obligation, intention, joint commitment, obligation, reason for action, will

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