- Title Pages
- 1 PAIN AS A SENSORY QUALITY
- 2 PLEASURE AS A SENSORY QUALITY
- 3 BEYOND HEDONISM
- 4 AN ANALYSIS OF DESIRE
- 5 THE CONCEPT OF EMOTION
- 6 A TYPOLOGY OF EMOTION
- 7 INTRODUCTION: SUBJECTIVISM AND OBJECTIVISM
- 8 THE STRUCTURE OF REASONS: INTERNALISM
- 9 AN OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT?
- 10 THE DESIRE RELATIVITY OF VALUE
- 11 THE RATIONALITY OF PARA-COGNITIVE ATTITUDES
- 12 WEAKNESS OF WILL
- 13 REPRESENTATIONAL MECHANISMS
- PART III Rationality and Temporal Neutrality
- 14 INTRODUCTION: THE NOTION OF A TEMPORAL BIAS
- 15 THE IRRATIONALITY OF THE BIAS TOWARDS THE NEAR
- 16 THE IRRATIONALITY OF THE BIAS TOWARDS THE FUTURE
- 17 THE DILEMMA AS REGARDS TEMPORAL NEUTRALITY
- PART IV Rationality and Personal Neutrality
- 18 INTRODUCTION: THE BIAS TOWARDS ONESELF
- 19 SELF AND BODY
- 20 PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORIES OF OUR IDENTITY
- 21 SOMATIST THEORIES OF OUR IDENTITY
- 22 THE IDENTITY OF MATERIAL BODIES
- 23 THE RATIONAL INSIGNIFICANCE OF IDENTITY AND CONTINUITY
- 24 SELF-CONCERN AND SELF-APPROVAL
- 25 CONCERN FOR AND APPROVAL OF OTHERS
- 26 PRUDENCE: MAXIMIZATION OR IDEALISM?
- 27 THE REQUIREMENT OF PERSONAL NEUTRALITY
- 28 MORAL INDIVIDUALISM: AUTONOMY AND AGREEMENT
- 29 THE DILEMMA AS REGARDS PERSONAL NEUTRALITY
- PART V Rationality and Responsibility
- 30 INTRODUCTION
- 31 PREDICTABILITY AND THE EXPERIENCE OF FREEDOM
- 32 COMPATIBILIST FREEDOM OF ACTION
- 33 COMPATIBILIST FREEDOM OF WILL
- 34 RESPONSIBILITY AND DESERT
- 35 THE DEONTOLOGICAL ELEMENT OF RESPONSIBILITY
- 36 THE EMOTIVE GENESIS OF DESERT
- 37 THE DILEMMA AS REGARDS RESPONSIBILITY
- Conclusion: THE CONFLICT BETWEEN RATIONALISM AND SATISFACTIONALISM
- Appendix ON BEING OUT OF TOUCH: THE ATTITUDINAL IMPACT OF INDIRECT REALISM
AN OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT?
AN OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT?
- (p.129) 9 AN OBJECTIVE REQUIREMENT?
- The Retreat of Reason
Ingmar Persson (Contributor Webpage)
- Oxford University Press
In this chapter the fact that desires have a direction of fit which is opposite to that of beliefs is employed to suggest that objectivism with respect to reasons for desire is implausible. Because desires are not formed to fit the world, but are rather formed to make the world fit their content, the idea of value as something desires must fit is not called for. Rather, desires fill their function if their object is something that one can bring about, thus satisfying the desire. It is maintained that this opposition as regards direction of fit explains why practical reasoning consists in the derivation of a desire for something which is sufficient for the end desired, while theoretical reasoning consists in the derivation of a belief whose truth is necessary if the premises are true. Some objectivist theories, e.g., John McDowell’s, are examined and rejected.
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