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The Samaritan's Dilemma – The Political Economy of Development Aid - Oxford Scholarship Online
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The Samaritan's Dilemma: The Political Economy of Development Aid

Clark C. Gibson, Krister Andersson, Elinor Ostrom, and Sujai Shivakumar


What’s wrong with development aid? It is argued that much of aid’s failure is related to the institutions that structure its delivery. These institutions govern the complex relationships between the main actors in the aid delivery system, and often generate a series of perverse incentives that promote inefficient and unsustainable outcomes. The theoretical insights of the new institutional economics are applied to several settings. First, the institutions of Sida, the Swedish aid agency, is investigated to analyze how that aid agency’s institutions can produce incentives inimical to desired ou ... More

Keywords: development assistance, aid, Samaritan’s Dilemma, Sida, India, Zambia, institutional analysis, sustainability, ownership

Bibliographic Information

Print publication date: 2005 Print ISBN-13: 9780199278855
Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005 DOI:10.1093/0199278857.001.0001


Affiliations are at time of print publication.

Clark C. Gibson, author
University of California, San Diego

Krister Andersson, author
Indiana University
Author Webpage

Elinor Ostrom, author
Indiana University
Author Webpage