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Future PeopleA Moderate Consequentialist Account of our Obligations to Future Generations$
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Tim Mulgan

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199282203

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/019928220X.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 23 January 2022

Hybrid Moral Theories

Hybrid Moral Theories

Chapter:
(p.82) 4 Hybrid Moral Theories
Source:
Future People
Author(s):

Tim Mulgan (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/019928220X.003.0004

This chapter applies Samuel Scheffler’s ‘Hybrid View’ to the morality of reproduction. It concludes that the Hybrid View does not provide a satisfactory account of our obligations to future generations, as it cannot accommodate either reproductive freedom or parental obligations. The Hybrid View fails because it cannot appreciate the collective moral significance of reproduction. This failure is shared by all other theories that retain the individualist focus of Simple Consequentialism, and thus motivates the exploration of collective forms of Consequentialism, which begins in Chapter 5.

Keywords:   Scheffler, reproduction, prerogatives, restrictions, hybrid view, parental obligations

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