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The Knowability Paradox$
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Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199282593

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199282595.001.0001

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Rules for the Knowledge Operator

Rules for the Knowledge Operator

(p.89) 4 Rules for the Knowledge Operator
The Knowability Paradox

Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter examines the idea that the logical principles governing the knowledge operator are the root cause of the paradox. There are two such principles: the first is that knowledge implies truth, and the second is that knowledge distributes over conjunction, so that knowledge of a conjunction constitutes knowledge of the conjuncts. It is argued that the paradox cannot be avoided by questioning these principles.

Keywords:   knowledge operator, truth, conjunction, paradox, Fred Dretske, Robert Nozick, closure

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