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The Knowability Paradox$
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Jonathan L. Kvanvig

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199282593

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199282595.001.0001

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Reservations about the Underlying Logic

Reservations about the Underlying Logic

(p.122) 5 Reservations about the Underlying Logic
The Knowability Paradox

Jonathan L. Kvanvig (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter explores the challenge to the proof of Fitch’s results presented by intuitionism, and the prospects of this viewpoint in avoiding the paradox that results. It argues that adopting intuitionistic principles of reasoning will not help avoid the paradox. It merely changes what is paradoxical from a lost distinction between known truth and knowable truth, to a lost distinction between unknown truth and unknowable truth. Since paradox remains in both cases, the solution to the paradox must be found elsewhere.

Keywords:   paradox, intuitionism, logic, truth, holistic coherence, John Pollock

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