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The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory$
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Richard Dean

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199285723

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199285721.001.0001

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How Duties Follow from the Categorical Imperative

How Duties Follow from the Categorical Imperative

Chapter:
(p.131) 7 How Duties Follow from the Categorical Imperative
Source:
The Value of Humanity in Kant's Moral Theory
Author(s):

Richard Dean (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199285721.003.0007

Kant recognizes that even if one accepts the humanity formulation as a basic moral principle, there is a further task of applying the principle to derive more specific categories of duties. Kant refers to the more complete system of duties as a ‘metaphysics of morals’. It is argued that the key concept in moving from the basic moral principle to a set of duties is the concept of Achtung, or respect for moral law and for persons who act on moral law. Unlike the proposals of some other commentators, the strategy suggested in this chapter does not depend on any brute claims about the value of persons, and so it succeeds in preserving Kant’s position that rational choice is conceptually prior to value.

Keywords:   Achtung, duties, metaphysics of morals, respect, value

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