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Environment and StatecraftThe Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making$
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Scott Barrett

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199286096

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199286094.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 17 June 2021

Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity

Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity

(p.269) 10 Compliance and the Strategy of Reciprocity
Environment and Statecraft

Scott Barrett (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

The theory developed in Chapter eight assumes that treaty participants always comply with their obligations. In this chapter, compliance is enforced endogenously. The main conclusion is that a self-enforcing treaty must enforce both participation and compliance, but that treaty participation is the binding constraint on international cooperation. If the conditions allow participation to be enforced, then compliance can also be enforced. The theory is illustrated by reference to the Fur Seal and Montreal Protocol treaties.

Keywords:   compliance, enforcement, repeated games, reciprocity, credible punishments, monitoring, verification

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