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Environment and StatecraftThe Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making$
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Scott Barrett

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199286096

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199286094.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 20 June 2021

Transnational Cooperation Dilemmas

Transnational Cooperation Dilemmas

(p.49) 3 Transnational Cooperation Dilemmas
Environment and Statecraft

Scott Barrett (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter develops a theoretical foundation for understanding international cooperation problems — why they arise, and why they are not easily addressed. Cooperation is cast as a game theoretic problem. In particular, full cooperation is shown not to be a Nash equilibrium, implying that full cooperation cannot be sustained by the anarchic international system. This framework is then examined from different perspectives, including experimental game theory, moral philosophy, and international relations. The theory is illustrated by the example of international whaling.

Keywords:   prisoners’ dilemma, externalities, Nash equilibrium, communication, transparency, commitment, sovereignty, preferences, self-interest, whaling

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