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Environment and StatecraftThe Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making$
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Scott Barrett

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199286096

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199286094.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 24 October 2021

The Treaty Participation Game

The Treaty Participation Game

Chapter:
(p.195) 7 The Treaty Participation Game
Source:
Environment and Statecraft
Author(s):

Scott Barrett (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199286094.003.0007

Building on the information developed in the previous six chapters, this chapter develops a theoretical model of international cooperation by means of the treaty instrument. The focus is on explaining why treaty participation is difficult to enforce. The theory shows that a treaty sustains cooperation by transforming the prisoners’ dilemma. It also shows that there is a limit to how far this approach can improve on non-cooperation. The theory is illustrated by the case study of conserving anadromous fish stocks.

Keywords:   payoffs, stage game, individual rationality, collective rationality, minimum participation, commitment, democracy, participation

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