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Environment and StatecraftThe Strategy of Environmental Treaty-Making$
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Scott Barrett

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199286096

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: October 2005

DOI: 10.1093/0199286094.001.0001

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PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 June 2021

Tipping Treaties

Tipping Treaties

Chapter:
(p.254) 9 Tipping Treaties
Source:
Environment and Statecraft
Author(s):

Scott Barrett (Contributor Webpage)

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/0199286094.003.0009

This chapter focuses on treaties that serve to coordinate international behavior. In this model, the minimum participation level is not the equilibrium participation level but the threshold participation level. When this minimum is reached, it pays all remaining non-participating countries to want to participate. This theory is applied to the case study of ocean dumping of oil by tankers.

Keywords:   conforming preferences, government-industry interactions, bandwagons, network externalities, technical standards

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