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Knowledge and Practical Interests$
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Jason Stanley

Print publication date: 2005

Print ISBN-13: 9780199288038

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: May 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199288038.001.0001

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Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Relativism

Interest‐Relative Invariantism versus Relativism

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Knowledge and Practical Interests

Jason Stanley (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

Relativism about knowledge-attributions is the thesis that knowledge attributions express propositions the truth of which is relative to a judge. On this view, a knowledge attribution may express a proposition that is true for one judge, and false for another. This chapter explains and criticizes various versions of relativism about knowledge attributions.

Keywords:   relativism, David Kaplan, Peter Lasersohn, Mark Richard, John MacFarlane, factivity, standards operator, Interest-Relative Invariantism

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