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Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard$
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Michelle Kosch

Print publication date: 2006

Print ISBN-13: 9780199289110

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: September 2006

DOI: 10.1093/0199289115.001.0001

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Kant on Autonomy and Moral Evil

Kant on Autonomy and Moral Evil

(p.44) 2 Kant on Autonomy and Moral Evil
Freedom and Reason in Kant, Schelling, and Kierkegaard

Michelle Kosch (Contributor Webpage)

Oxford University Press

This chapter charts the evolution of Kant’s approach to moral evil. It lays out an apparent problem with Kant’s account of the connection between the freedom required for moral responsibility and the freedom of rational autonomy: that if the former requires the latter, then imputable moral evil is impossible.

Keywords:   Kant, freedom, evil, Reinhold, Schmidt, intelligible fatalism, categorical imperative, causality, autonomy

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