Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Identified versus Statistical LivesAn Interdisciplinary Perspective$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

I. Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels, and Nir Eyal

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780190217471

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217471.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2022. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use.date: 25 January 2022

Why Not Empathy?

Why Not Empathy?

Chapter:
(p.150) 10 Why Not Empathy?
Source:
Identified versus Statistical Lives
Author(s):

Michael Slote

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217471.003.0011

Empathy may be more relevant to moral distinctions between identified and statistical victims than has been realized. A form of virtue ethics that anchors morality in empathic caring reactions can not only deal with traditional normative issues of deontology and justice, but can also offer an account of the meaning of moral terms that allows one to answer the objections Kantians and other rationalists have raised against sentimentalist metaethics. Empathy is precisely more sensitive to what has been identified than to what is statistical, so a sentimentalist approach can offer positive reasons to think the identified vs. statistical distinction carries moral weight, and, most specifically, it can also account for the some of the findings in the empirical literature concerning this issue.

Keywords:   empathy, sentimentalism, identified victims, Kant, rationalism

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .