Jump to ContentJump to Main Navigation
Identified versus Statistical LivesAn Interdisciplinary Perspective$
Users without a subscription are not able to see the full content.

I. Glenn Cohen, Norman Daniels, and Nir Eyal

Print publication date: 2015

Print ISBN-13: 9780190217471

Published to Oxford Scholarship Online: April 2015

DOI: 10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217471.001.0001

Show Summary Details
Page of

PRINTED FROM OXFORD SCHOLARSHIP ONLINE (oxford.universitypressscholarship.com). (c) Copyright Oxford University Press, 2021. All Rights Reserved. An individual user may print out a PDF of a single chapter of a monograph in OSO for personal use. date: 16 June 2021

Can There be Moral Force to Favoring an Identified over a Statistical Life?

Can There be Moral Force to Favoring an Identified over a Statistical Life?

Chapter:
(p.110) 7 Can There be Moral Force to Favoring an Identified over a Statistical Life?
Source:
Identified versus Statistical Lives
Author(s):

Norman Daniels

Publisher:
Oxford University Press
DOI:10.1093/acprof:oso/9780190217471.003.0008

Some researchers attribute the bias in favor of identified persons over statistical persons at risk to the concentration of risk that identified victims face. If they are right, and the concentration of risk is the factor underlying the identified person bias, can this bias ever be morally justified? Both consequentialist and nonconsequentialist theorists reasonably disagree about this issue. I argue that there can be a justification of a bias in favor of one identified person at greater risk than one statistical person because the identified person is worse off (I set aside the issue about whether one identified person can be favored in this way over more than one statistical person). Given the very limited scope of the argument and the pervasiveness of ethical disagreement about the justifiability of the bias, procedural justice should be relied on to resolve resulting policy disagreements.

Keywords:   identified persons, statistical persons, reasonable disagreement, concentration of risk, justifiable bias, worse off

Oxford Scholarship Online requires a subscription or purchase to access the full text of books within the service. Public users can however freely search the site and view the abstracts and keywords for each book and chapter.

Please, subscribe or login to access full text content.

If you think you should have access to this title, please contact your librarian.

To troubleshoot, please check our FAQs , and if you can't find the answer there, please contact us .